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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant's Statement of the Case contains argument, unsubstantiated and inaccurate 
statements, or statements not supported by the record. Respondents object to the Appellant's 
inclusion of improper argument in his Statement of the Case but will respond to that argument in 
the Argument portion of this brief. Respondents provide this statement of the case as to the nature 
of the case, the course of the proceedings in the hearing below and its disposition, and a concise 
statement of the facts. 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment awarded in favor of the State ofldaho and the 
Department of Fish and Game (hereinafter "IDFG") because Plaintiff's theories ofnegligence were 
solely based upon suspicion and speculation. R. Vol. II, p. 400. The district court granted summary 
judgment because Plaintiff Perry Krinitt, Sr., (hereinafter "Krinitt, Sr." or "Plaintiff') failed to 
present any admissible evidence to support the essential elements of his claim and he failed to show, 
via depositions, discovery responses or affidavits, that there was a genuine issue of material fact for 
trial. R. Vol. II, p. 398. 
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY. 
On August 31, 2012, Krinitt, Sr., filed an action in the District Court for the Second Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, Lewis County, seeking damages against IDFG stemming from the 
death of his adult son Perry J. Krinitt (hereinafter "Krinitt") in a helicopter crash on August 31, 
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2010. Krinitt' s adult sister, Erynn Peralta, was initially a plaintiff in the action. However, her claims 
were dismissed pursuant to a motion for summary judgment and that dismissal is not a part of this 
appeal. R. Vol. I, p. 20-21. 
Following substantial discovery, IDFG filed a motion for summary judgment on January 31, 
2014, contending that Krinitt, Sr., had failed to produce any admissible evidence demonstrating that 
IDFG employee Danielle Schiff (hereinafter "Schiff") was negligent or that her conduct was a 
proximate cause of this tragedy. In his complaint, Krinitt, Sr., alleged that Schiff, who was an 
occupant of the helicopter, became airsick and, as the helicopter approached Kamiah, Idaho, to land, 
Schiff opened the door of the helicopter, lost control of her clipboard, and allowed it exit the 
helicopter. R. Vol. I, p. 7. IDFG asserted, and the trial court agreed, that Krinitt, Sr., had not 
produced any evidence that Schiff became airsick, that she opened the door of the helicopter, or that 
she had control of the clipboard prior to it exiting the helicopter. The district court concluded that 
Krinitt, Sr., had presented only suspicion and speculation as to what Schiff' s acts or omissions might 
have been. R. Vol. II, p. 394-399. 
After IDFG filed its motion for summary judgment contending that Krinitt, Sr., had failed 
to present any admissible evidence in support of his allegations, Krinitt, Sr., responded with the 
affidavits of two experts, Douglas Stimpson and Larry Grandy, and presented portions of the 
deposition testimony of several witnesses. After realizing that he had no admissible evidence to 
support his theory of what Schiff may have done to cause the clipboard to exit the helicopter, he 
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modified his theory by arguing that however the door came to be open, Schiff had failed to keep the 
clipboard in the cockpit and, for that reason, she caused the crash. R. Vol. I, p. 47. Oral argument 
was held before Honorable District Judge Michael J. Griffin on May 30, 2014. Tr. 1. At oral 
argument, IDFG responded to Krinitt, Sr. 's, new assertion, contending that, as with his previous 
theory, the revised theory was factually unsupported and speculative and, therefore, insufficient to 
create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Tr. 7-8. 
The trial court properly granted summary judgment on July 7, 2014, ruling that Krinitt, Sr., 
had not presented any evidence that the clipboard was in Schiff's possession prior to it exiting the 
helicopter, that it was not known how or why the door was open, and that Krinitt, Sr., had relied only 
upon speculation and suspicion to support his claim. R. Vol. II, 3 94-40 I. 
C. FACTS. 
On August 31, 2010, Krinitt, an employee of Leading Edge Aviation, was the pilot of a 
Hiller 12E Soloy helicopter contracted to transport IDFG employees Larry Barrett (hereinafter 
"Barrett") and Schiff on a salmon survey along the Selway River. R. Vol. I, p. 7. Krinitt, Schiff and 
Barrett met at Leading Edge Aviation in Lewiston, Idaho, that morning and the flight took off from 
there. R. Vol. I, p. 7. Approximately 50 minutes after take off, the helicopter crashed in Kamiah, 
Idaho. 1 R. Vol. I. p. 7. All three occupants sustained fatal injuries in the crash. R. Vol. I. p. 7. 
The times of events vary somewhat between the various investigative reports of the accident, 
the testimony of witnesses, and Plaintiffs Complaint for Wrongful Death. Therefore, the time of 
the events are stated as they are stated in Plaintiffs Complaint, if they are contained in the 
Complaint. 
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Based upon the joint discovery conducted with the companion lawsuit, the parties learned 
that the Hiller helicopter had undergone several modifications from its original configuration. R. 
Vol. Supp., p. 467-468. Specifically, it had been modified from a four-seat configuration to a three-
seat configuration. R. Vol. Supp., p. 467-468. In addition, the Hiller's standard doors had been 
changed to "bubble" doors. R. Vol. Supp., p. 464. The latch system on the bubble doors was 
different than on Hiller-manufactured doors. R. Vol. Supp., p. 463. Furthermore, the latch 
mechanism on the right bubble door at the time of the crash was different than the latch that was on 
the left door of the helicopter. R. Vol. Supp., p. 465-466. 
Before this incident, both the left and right doors of the helicopter had a history of popping 
open spontaneously. R. Vol. I, p. 150. The right door had popped open in the month before this 
accident. R. Vol. I, p. 150. The door was adjusted to try to fix this deficiency. R. Vol. I, p. 150-151. 
It is not known, however, what was done to try to fix the door. R. Vol. I, p. 150-15 l. 
The helicopter left Leading Edge Aviation at 8:40 a.m. and crashed approximately 50 
minutes later in Kamiah, Idaho. R. Vol. I, p. 7. At approximately 9:29 a.m., Krinitt radioed 
StateCom and indicated that he intended to land in Kamiah. R. Vol. I, p. 7. No explanation for this 
landing or further communication was ever received. R. Vol. I, p. 7. A few minutes later, the 
helicopter crashed. R. Vol. I, p. 7. 
At some point during the Hiller's approach to Kamiah, two witnesses observed that the right-
side door was open. R. Vol. Supp., p. 445-449, 451-454. However, no one saw a person open the 
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door. R. Vol. Supp., p. 445-449, R. 451-454. No one knows if this was the only time the door was 
open during the approximately 50 minutes the helicopter was in flight. No one knows why the door 
came to be open and no one can say how long the door had been open. R. Vol. Supp., p. 445-449, 
4 78, 451-454. In fact, several individuals testified that this helicopter door had a history of popping 
open on its own in the past. R. Vol. I, p. 152, R. Vol. Supp. 469. 
No one knows exactly how or when the door came to be open, how or when the clipboard 
left the helicopter, how or when the clipboard struck the tail rotor, or who had the clipboard in the 
approximate 50 minutes the helicopter was in the air. R. Vol. Supp., p. 445-449, 478, 451-454; R. 
Vol. II, 394-395.2 No one saw the clipboard exit the cockpit. R. Vol. Supp, p. 445-449, 451-454. 
The only testimony is that the clipboard had been last seen on the right-side seat of the helicopter 
before the occupants entered the cockpit and the helicopter left Leading Edge Aviation. (See 
Footnote 2). There is no testimony as to where the clipboard was in the 50 minutes the helicopter 
was in flight. R. Vol. II, p. 225. There was storage space in the helicopter. R. Vol. I, p. 139. The 
clipboard could have been behind a seat, in the door, on the floor, between the seats, or elsewhere. 
R. Vol. II, p. 225, II. 9-17. In summary, there are no eyewitnesses who saw the door being opened 
by Schiff or anyone else and there are no eyewitnesses who saw the clipboard exit the helicopter. 
2 Atchison Deposition, pg. 83 (included in Certificate of Peter J. Johnson Regarding 
Defendants' Response Memorandum, filed May 8, 2014). This deposition testimony was 
inadvertently left out of the record on appeal, and is the subject of Defendants-Respondents' Motion 
to Augment Record. 
RESPONDENTS' BRJEF - 5 
II. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
In an appeal from an order granting a motion for summary judgment, the Court reviews the 
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, to determine 
whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, and whether the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter oflaw. l.R.C.P. 56(c);Rayv. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 120 Idaho 117,814 
P.2d 17 (1991). This Court's standard ofreview is the same as the standard used by the district court. 
McDonald v. Paine, I l 9 Idaho 725, 810 P.2d 259 (1991 ). 
The party moving for summary judgment initially carries the burden to establish that there 
is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Eliopulos 
v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404, 848 P.2d 984, 988 (Ct. App. 1992). The burden may be met by 
establishing the absence of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to 
prove at trial. Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 311, 882 P.2d 475, 478 (Ct. App. 1994). Such an 
absence of evidence may be established either by an affirmative showing with the moving party's 
own evidence or by a review of all the nonmoving party's evidence and the contention that such 
proofofan element is lacking. Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 712, 8 P.3d 1254, 
1255 (Ct. App. 2000). Once such an absence ofevidence has been established, the burden then shifts 
to the party opposing the motion to show, via further depositions, discovery responses or affidavits, 
that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial or to offer a valid justification for the failure to do so 
under I.R.C.P. 56(f). Sanders v. Kuna Joint Sch. Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct. 
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App. 1994). It is critical to note that "evidence presented in support of or in opposition to motions 
for summary judgment must be admissible evidence .... " Hecla Min. Co. v. Star-Morning Min. Co., 
122 Idaho 778,784,839 P.2d 1192, 1198 (1992). 
IDFG acknowledges that on appellate review, the Court must construe the record favorably 
to the party resisting summary judgment. E.g., Intermountain Business Forms, Inc., v. Shepard 
Business Forms Co., 96 Idaho 538, 531 P.2d 1183 (1975). "However, this axiom does not blind [the 
Court] to the difference between a factual showing and a bare allegation." Barlow's, Inc. v. Bannock 
Cleaning Corp., 103 Idaho 310, 313-14, 647 P.2d 766, 769-70 (Ct. App. 1982). Specifically, 
affidavits containing general or conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific facts, are not 
sufficient to preclude entry of a summary judgment. Barlow's Inc., 103 Idaho at 314; see also Bob 
Daniels & Sons v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535, 541, 681 P.2d 1010, 1016 (Ct. App. 1984). A mere 
scintilla of evidence will not suffice to create a genuine issue of fact. Evans v. Twin Falls County, 
118 Idaho 210, 796 P.2d 87 (1990); Johnson v. Gorton, 94 Idaho 595, 495 P.2d l (1972). 
Moreover, a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving 
party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Bade/! v. Beeks, 115 Idaho IO 1, 765 P.2d 
126 (1988) (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 
( 1986)). In this situation, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because the 
nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case with 
respect to which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 
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at 2552-53. The language and reasoning of Celotex has been adopted by the appellate courts of 
Idaho. See, e.g., G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,517,808 P.2d 851,854 (1991). 
This rule facilitates the dismissal of factually unsupported claims prior to trial. See Garzee v. 
Barkley, 121 Idaho 771,828 P.2d 334 (Ct.App.1992); Bennettv. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1532 (1 Ith 
Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. l 103, 111 S.Ct. 1003, 112 L.Ed.2d 1085 (1991). 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION. 
There is no admissible evidence demonstrating Schiff s conduct was a proximate cause of 
this tragedy. Krinitt, Sr., contends that there is a genuine issue concerning whether and why Schiff 
opened the door and whether Schiff failed to maintain control of the IDFG clipboard, which conduct 
caused the accident. Appellant's Brief, p. 33. Krinitt, Sr., argues that because Schiff was seated in 
the right-side seat, she must have had the clipboard. R. Vol. II, p. 225. However, he has failed to 
present any admissible evidence in support of these allegations. No one knows and there is no 
evidence of how or why the door of the helicopter was open. No one saw a person open the door. 
No one knows and there is no evidence as to where the clipboard was in the 50 or more minutes after 
it was last seen on the seat of the helicopter before the occupants entered the helicopter. There is 
no evidence that any conduct on the part of Schiff caused this accident. Krinitt, Sr., presents only 
speculation and conjecture that Schiff felt ill and that she opened the door of the helicopter. 
Likewise, he presents nothing more than speculation and conjecture that she had control of the 
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clipboard and that she failed to maintain control of it. Instead, Krinitt, Sr., offers a theory of 
imagined conduct by Schiff which amounts to pure conjecture and suspicion. A claim of negligence 
cannot rest upon guesswork, speculation or conjecture and, accordingly, summary judgment was 
appropriate. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE RELEVANT LAW. 
1. The District Court Properly Applied the Summary Judgment Standard. 
A motion for summary judgment must be granted by a district court "if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw. 11 
I.R.C.P. 56(c). To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party's case must 
consist of more than speculation, it must create a genuine issue regarding a material fact. G&M 
Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho at 517. The district court is not required to accept as true 
allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences. 
See Lordv. Swire Pacific Holdings, Inc., 203 F. Supp.2d 1175, 1178 (D. Idaho 2002); Cleggv. Cult 
Awareness Network, l 8 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir.1994); Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 
F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). 
The district court considered all of the evidence submitted by Plaintiff in opposition to IDFG's 
summary judgment motion, including the affidavits of his experts, deposition testimony and 
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discovery responses. After doing so, it ruled that Krinitt, Sr., had failed to present evidence 
sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact. 
2. Krinitt, Sr., Failed to Submit Evidence to Establish Essential Elements of His 
Claim. 
In order to survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must "make a 
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on which that 
party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Badell, 115 Idaho at 102. Thus, a plaintiff is required 
to establish the existence of the essential elements ofnegligence in order to survive the motion for 
summary judgment. Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257, 259-60, 245 P.3d 1009, 1011-12 (2011). A 
cause of action for common law negligence in Idaho has four elements: ( 1) a duty, recognized by 
law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; 
(3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and ( 4) actual loss 
or damage. Nation v. State, Dep 'to/Corr., 144 Idaho 177, 189, 158 P.3d 953, 965 (2007) (quoting 
O'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 52, 122 P.3d 308,311 (2005)). Negligence is a fact to 
be proven either by direct or circumstantial evidence and is not presumed on conjecture or 
speculation. Osier v. The Consumers Co., 41 Idaho 268, 239 P. 735 ( 1925). 
The Idaho Supreme Court discussed circumstantial evidence in Dent v. Hardware Mut. 
Casualty Co., 86 Idaho 427, 388 P.2d 89 (1963): 
[IJn discussing the question of the sufficiency of the record to sustain a judgment for 
plaintiff in a negligence action, the majority opinion stated ... 
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Circumstantial evidence is competent to establish negligence and proximate cause. 
Facts, which are essential to a liability for negligence, may be inferred from 
circumstances which are established by evidence. But, where circumstantial 
evidence is relied upon, the circumstances must be proved, and not themselves 
be left to presumption or inference. This court has held that inference cannot 
be based upon inference, nor presumption on presumption. 
The underlying principle applicable here is that a verdict cannot rest on conjecture; 
that where a party seeks to establish a liability by circumstantial evidence, he must 
establish circumstances of such nature and so related to each other that his theory of 
liability is the more reasonable conclusion to be drawn therefrom; and that where 
the proven facts are equally consistent with the absence, as with the existence, 
of negligence on the part of defendant, the plaintiff has not carried the burden 
of proof and cannot recover. 
Dent, 86 Idaho at 433-434, (citations omitted) (emphasis added.) 
As articulated by Dent, there is a vast difference between circumstantial evidence and pure 
speculation. Krinitt, Sr., attempts to characterize speculations and unsupported conclusions as 
circumstantial evidence. Asserting a possibility as "fact" and then theorizing circumstances which 
are potentially consistent with this possibility, as he has done in an attempt to establish the alleged 
negligent conduct by Schiff, is not sufficient to avoid summary judgment. 
Flimsy or transparent contentions, theoretical questions of fact which are not 
genuine, or disputes as to matters of form do not create genuine issues which will 
preclude summary judgment. Neither is a mere pleading allegation sufficient to 
create a genuine issue as against affidavits and other evidentiary materials which 
show the allegation to be false. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create 
an issue; there must be evidence on which a jury might rely. A popular formula is 
that summary judgment should be granted on the same kind of showing as would 
permit direction of a verdict were the case to be tried. 
Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., Inc., 92 Idaho 865, 871, 452 P.2d 362 (1969). 
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Idaho courts have long held that mere conjecture and speculation cannot be indulged in to 
establish negligence or proximate cause. Cooper v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 45 Idaho 313, 262 P. 
873(I927);Antlerv. Cox,27Idaho517, 149P. 731 (1915). 
Proofofa bare possibility that an injury may be due to a given cause does not justify 
a finding that it was so caused. The evidence must furnish some logical basis for a 
finding that the result was probably due to the alleged cause .... Where the testimony 
leaves the matter uncertain, it is not for the jury to speculate or guess that the 
negligence of the defendant was the cause, when there is no satisfactory foundation 
in the testimony for that conclusion. As quoted favorably by this court in Holt v. 
Spokane etc. Ry. Co., 4 Idaho 443, 40 P. 56: 
Every party to an action at law has a right to insist upon a verdict 
or finding based upon the law and the evidence in the case, and 
not, in the absence of the evidence, upon mere inference, 
conjecture or personal experience. 
Macaw v. Oregon S. L. R.R., 49 Idaho 151, 157-158, 286 P. 606 (1930) (emphasis added). 
(a) Duty. 
Whether a duty of care exists is a question of law. Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247, 
985 P.2d 669, 672 ( 1999). "No liability exists under the law of torts unless the person from whom 
reliefis sought owed a duty to the allegedly injured party." Vickers v. Hanover Cons tr. Co., Inc., 125 
Idaho 832, 835, 875 P .2d 929, 932 (1994). Here, Krinitt, Sr., alleges that Schiff had a duty to prevent 
the clipboard from exiting the helicopter. Appellant's Brief, p. 33. The duty element recognizes 
that every person "has a 'duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent unreasonable,foreseeable risks 
of harm to others."' Nation, 144 Idaho at 190-91. As the district court noted in its findings, James 
Pope, (hereinafter "Pope") a helicopter pilot, owner of the helicopter involved in the crash, and 
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owner of Leading Edge Aviation, testified in his deposition that prior to this accident Leading Edge 
did not have any lanyards or tethering devices available to secure clipboards because they did not 
recognize clipboards as a hazard. R. Vol. I, p. 140. Here the evidence is succinct and clear-not even 
the helicopter owner, himself a pilot, recognized any hazards with clipboards. Nonetheless, Krinitt, 
Sr., argues that Schiff had a duty to foresee a hazard not even recognized by an experienced 
helicopter pilot and Leading Edge Aviation. 
(b) Breach of Duty. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Schiff was required to foresee a hazard which the helicopter pilots 
did not, Krinitt, Sr., must still present specific facts establishing that some action by Schiff breached 
this duty. Krinitt, Sr.'s briefis replete with conclusory statements and imaginary conduct by Schiff, 
but he does not cite to any evidence. His response to IDFG' s summary judgment motion relied upon 
the affidavits and/or deposition testimony of Douglas Stimpson, Larry Grandy, and James Pope3 in 
an attempt to show that there was a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Stimpson opined that: 1) 
it is likely Schiff became nauseous (Appellant's Brief, p. 8); 2) Schiff"most likely" opened the door 
of the helicopter (Appellant's Brief, p. 9); and 3) Schiff failed to control the clipboard (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 10). Grandy opined that: "A likely reason for the exit of the clipboard was that Ms. Schiff 
experienced significant nausea, opened the right cockpit door, and allowed the clipboard to exit the 
3 The admissibility of the opinions of Stimpson and Grandy are addressed in later in 
Respondents' Brief. However, for purposes of addressing Plaintiffs contention that he submitted 
sufficient evidence to present a genuine issue of material fact for trial, their opinions are discussed. 
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cockpit," and Schiff "did not maintain the required level of security" over the clipboard. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 33). To bolster these "opinions," Krinitt, Sr., offered the deposition testimony 
of Pope who testified that Schiff had previously experienced motion sickness. (Appellant's Brief, 
p. 40; R. Vol. I, p. 144.) He also presented evidence that there was a Sea-Band (anti-motion sickness 
band) found in the wreckage. (Appellant's Brief, p. 40; R. Vol. II, p. 361-362.) However, the 
testimony Stimpson relied upon to establish his opinion was dubious. Stimpson concludes that 
Schiff was prone to airsickness based on his interpretation of Mike Atchison's deposition testimony 
that at some point in time Atchison became aware that Schiff was prone to airsickness. R. Vol. II, 
p. 214, II. 9-11. However, Stimpson failed to include in his report any other references in Atchison's 
deposition that are did support this conclusion. R. Vol. II, p. 214, 11. 12-18. For example, Atchison 
testified at deposition to the following: 
• "I don't know if she said she was prone to airsickness at the briefing or not."4 
• "I don't have any evidence that she got sick." R. Vol. I, p. 59, II. 16-18. 
• "I don't recall exactly when she told me that." (Schiff getting airsick in the past.)5 
4 Atchison Deposition, pg. 96, II. 19-20 (included in Certificate of Peter J. Johnson Regarding 
Defendants' Response Memorandum, filed May 8, 2014). This deposition testimony was 
inadvertently left out of the record on appeal, and is the subject of Defendants-Respondents' Motion 
to Augment Record. 
5 Atchison Deposition, pg. 95, II. 25 (included in Certificate of Peter J. Johnson Regarding 
Defendants' Response Memorandum, filed May 8, 2014). This deposition testimony was 
inadvertently left out of the record on appeal, and is the subject of Defendants-Respondents' Motion 
to Augment Record .. 
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• "[Y]ou asked me why I didn't document it [Schiff comment as to airsickness] in this 
statement; is that correct? . . . I didn't believe I knew that at the time. I don't believe I did know that 
at the time." (At the time of typing his statement the day after the accident.)6 
"I don't know if I knew that she was prone to airsickness. You said prone to 
airsickness. I don't know that she was prone to airsickness at that point in time or ifI found that out 
later. I don't remember."7 
Contrary to the arguments of Krinitt, Sr., the affidavits and testimony he offered fail to 
establish that Schiff did anything to cause this accident. The opinions proffered by Stimpson and 
Grandy are nothing more than a story of imagined conduct on the part of Schiff. There is absolutely 
no evidence as to whom the Sea-Band belonged; that Schiff felt ill; or that any person opened the 
door. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that unsupported statements and opinions are 
insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact to defeat a motion for summary judgment: 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56( e) governs the defense of a motion for summary 
judgment, and states, in relevant part: 
6 Atchison Deposition, pg. 96, II. 22-23, and pg. 97, II. 5-6 (included in Certificate of Peter 
J. Johnson Regarding Defendants' Response Memorandum, filed May 8, 2014). This deposition 
testimony was inadvertently left out of the record on appeal, and is the subject of Defendants-
Respondents' Motion to Augment Record. 
7 Atchison Deposition, pg. 97, II. 14-18 (included in Certificate of Peter J. Johnson Regarding 
Defendants' Response Memorandum, filed May 8, 2014). This deposition testimony was 
inadvertently left out of the record on appeal, and is the subject ofDefendants-Respondents' Motion 
to Augment Record. 
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When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this 
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that 
party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56( e) is identical to its federal counterpart and, thus, 
we find federal law instructive to this Court's analysis of the issue at hand. It is not 
the intent of F.R.C.P. 56 "to preserve purely speculative issues of fact for trial." 
Exxon Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 663 F.2d 120, 128 (D.C.Cir.1980). A party 
opposing summary judgment cannot demand a trial simply because of the 
"speculative possibility that a material issue of fact may appear at that time." 1 OB 
Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane, Wright Miller & Kane, 
Federal Practice and ProcedureE § 2739 at 388-89 (3d ed.1998). See Childers v. 
High Society Magazine, Inc., 557 F.Supp. 978,984 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (an unsupported 
statement that "it might not be so" was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact to defeat a motion for summary judgment). Moreover, it is well settled 
that a mere scintilla of evidence or only a slight doubt as to the facts is insufficient 
to withstand summary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 
730 P.2d 1005, I 007 ( 1986). 
Heath, 134 Idaho at, 713-714. 
(c) Purely Speculative Issues of Fact are Not Appropriate for Trial. 
The trial court correctly recognized the extensive speculation engaged in by Krinitt, Sr., and 
found, among other things, that: 
1. Other than three occupants of the helicopter, the last person to see the clipboard 
observed it lying on the seat where Ms. Schiff was going to ride more than 50 minutes before the 
crash. See Footnote 2; R. Vol. II, p. 395. 
2. No one knows exactly how or when the clipboard left the helicopter and struck the 
tail rotor. R. Vol. II, p. 397; R. Vol. Supp, p. 445-449, 451-454. 
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3. There is no evidence indicating who had control over the clipboard during the 50 
minutes after the helicopter left Leading Edge Aviation or just prior to the door being opened. See 
Footnote 2; R. Vol. II, p. 397; R. Vol. Supp, p. 445-449, 451-454. 
4. Krinitt, Sr., did not offer any facts to show that Schiff or Barrett had exclusive control 
over the clipboard. The pilot was also in the cockpit and had access to the clipboard. R. Vol. I, p. 
7; R. Vol. II., p. 397. 
5. The owner of the helicopter and a helicopter pilot, Mr. Pope, did not recognize the 
clipboard as a hazard [R. Vol. I, p. 140] and it was not foreseeable having a clipboard fall out of this 
helicopter and engage with the rear rotor. R. Vol. II, p. 397. 
6. There is no evidence that Schiff felt ill during this flight. R. Vol. II, p. 215-217; R. 
Vol. II, p. 397. 
7. No evidence was found that anyone on the flight got sick.8 R. Vol. II, p. 215-217; R. 
Vol. II, p. 397. 
8. There is no evidence that the Sea-Band belonged to Schiff. R. Vol. I, p. 145; R. Vol. 
II, p. 233; R. Vol. II, p. 397. 
9. There is no evidence that the clipboard was in Schiffs possession at the time when 
the door opened. See Footnote 2; R. Vol. II, p. 397. 
8 Krinitt, Sr., alleges that there may have been evidence that was destroyed but this argument 
is nothing more than pure speculation and there was no motion before the district as to any evidence. 
There is nothing in the record before this Court regarding this allegation. 
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The district court, in considering summary judgment, viewed all facts in a light most 
favorable to Krinitt, Sr., and drew all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of him. G&M 
Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho at 517; Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho at 
874. To withstand a motion for summary judgment, Krinitt, Sr.'s case had to consist of more than 
speculation. G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho at 517. Krinitt, Sr., was required to 
submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact existed to withstand 
summary judgment. He was required to set forth, by affidavit or deposition, specific facts showing 
a genuine issue. I.R.C.P. 56(e); Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 896-897, 155 P.3d 695, 697-698 
(2007). Krinitt, Sr., failed to meet this burden. Because a verdict cannot rest on speculation or 
conjecture, (Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 46, 844 P.2d 24, 28 (Ct. App. 1992) citing Petersen v. 
Parry, 92 Idaho 647,652,448 P.2d 653,658 (1968)), the district court correctly ruled that Krinitt, 
Sr.'s claim was based only upon suspicion and speculation and, therefore, did not raise a genuine 
issue for trial. R. Vol. II, p. 3 97. 
C. THE FINDINGS OFF ACT OF THE DISTRICT COURT ARE NOT BINDING. 
In his assignments of error, Krinitt, Sr., questions certain findings and conclusions issued by 
the district court with the order granting summary judgment. The district court's findings did not 
determine disputed issues of fact but only enumerated the extensive number of issues for which 
there was no evidence and which were the subject of impermissible conjecture. The district court 
found that there were no material issues of fact and that IDFG was entitled to summary judgment. 
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Even if the findings were not as clearly articulated as they might have been, findings of fact in a 
summary judgment motion are not binding on appeal. In that regard, Stewart v. Hood Corp., 95 
Idaho 198, 506 P.2d 95 (1973) held: 
Rule 52(a), I.R.C.P. expressly provides that findings of fact are not necessary in 
deciding motions under Rule 56. As stated in 3 Barron & Holtzoff, Fed. Practice and 
Procedure, (Wright ed. 1958) s 1242, pp. 201-202: 
Logically, findings of fact should not be made in disposing of 
motions for summary judgment. Findings are appropriate only in 
deciding issues of fact. In granting a motion for summary judgment, 
however, the court merely rules that there are no material issues of 
fact and decides questions oflaw. In denying such a motion, the court 
holds that there are material issues of fact to be tried, but does not 
decide them. But despite logic, there is no objection to a court 
making findings of fact if it wishes to do so, in granting a motion for 
summary judgment. Such findings may well be helpful to the 
appellate court in making clear the basis for the trial court's decisions. 
Findings gratuitously made, however, are not entitled to the respect 
which an appellate court is required to give findings made pursuant 
to Rule 52(a). 
In ruling on an appeal from a summary judgment the Court will only determine: 
1. Whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact; and 
2. Whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Id., at 200. 
It is clear from the record that the district court reviewed all the pleadings, depositions, 
admissions on file, and affidavits submitted. R. Vol. II, p. 397-398. In reviewing all the evidence 
submitted, the district court held that Krinitt, Sr., failed to present any admissible evidence to 
establish any genuine issue of material fact. While the district court's issuance of findings were not 
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required, they are helpful to assess the depth of the trial court's review of the materials presented 
at summary judgment. However, they were not necessary, are not binding, and are not a basis for 
reversing the district court's ruling. 
D. THE FACTS AND ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES WERE CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT MOST 
FAVORABLE TO KRINITT, SR. 
Krinitt, Sr., argues that the district court failed to "heed fact disputes raised in [expert] 
affidavits." Krinitt, Sr., also argues that had the district court "properly" applied the summary 
judgment standard, it "was required to deny Fish & Game's request for summary judgment if there 
was sufficient factual evidence from which a[n] ... expert could offer competent, fact-based 
testimony ... " Appellant's Brief, p. 16-17. In actuality, Krinitt, Sr., argues that the district court 
should have merely accepted the conclusions that Plaintiff offered without regard to whether they 
were factually supported. This would lead to a result contrary to well-established Idaho law. 
"There is no sure way to distinguish between a legitimate inference to which a party is 
entitled and an unreasonable one which he is not." Owen v. Burcham, 100 Idaho 441, 448, 599 P.2d 
l 0 12, l 0 19 (1979) ( citations omitted). "It is well established [, however,] that an inference would 
be unreasonable if it would permit a jury to base its verdict on mere speculation and conjecture." 
Id. (citations omitted). 
Krinitt, Sr.'s experts offered only guess and supposition as to what Schiff may have been 
feeling or what she may have done. Not only that, the foundation upon which they based their 
speculative conclusion that Schiff "most likely" opened the door was the speculation that she must 
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have felt ill. There is absolutely no evidence that this was the case. Indeed, even that speculative 
conclusion is based upon another speculation - that the Sea-Band found in the wreckage belonged 
to Schiff. There is no evidence that this was the case. R. Vol. I, p. 145. Stimpson even stated in his 
deposition that the NTSB information he relied upon for his conclusion that the Sea-Band belonged 
to Schiff was an "inference": [The NTSB research didn't identify who the owner was] "by direct 
knowledge. They did by inference." R. Vol. II, p. 211, II. 20-23. Finally, Krinitt, Sr., offered the 
speculative conclusion that Schiff failed to medicate against motion sickness and that this was the 
cause of the accident. It is axiomatic that mere allegation and speculation do not constitute evidence 
which creates a factual dispute for purposes of summary judgment. See Nelson v. Pima Cmty. Coll., 
83 F.3d 1075, 1081-82 (9th Cir.1996) (citing Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264,266 (9th Cir.1995)). 
Plaintiff's experts did nothing more than engage in pure speculation: 
Other courts have also held that experts may not give "net" or conclusory opinions, 
but only opinions which are substantiated by facts in evidence. McGlinchy v. Shell 
Chemical Co., 845 F .2d 802, 806 (9th Cir.1988) ( district court properly excluded 
opinion testimony of expert who did not back up his opinion with specific facts, 
rather his opinion was speculative, resting on unsupported assumptions); Theonnes 
v. Hazen, 37 Wash.App. 644,681 P.2d 1284 (1984) (opinion of an expert must be 
based on facts, and an opinion which is simply a conclusion or is based on an 
assumption is not evidence which will take the case to the jury). [The admissibility 
of expert opinion testimony] depends on the expert's ability to explain pertinent 
scientific principles and to apply those principles to the formulation of his or her 
opinion. Thus, the key to admission of the opinion is the validity of the expert's 
reasoning and methodology. In resolving these issues, the trial court should not 
substitute its judgment for that of the relevant scientific community. The court's 
function is to distinguish scientifically sound reasoning from that of the self-
validating expert, who uses scientific terminology to present unsubstantiated 
personal beliefs. 
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Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho at 46 citing Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 127 NJ. 404,605 A.2d 1079, 
1084 (1992). 
While the non-moving party is entitled to the benefit of certain inferences, those inferences 
must be reasonable. Reasonable inferences must be more than speculation and conjecture. See 
Owen, 100 Idaho at 448. The district court was entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the facts 
in the record, and was not required to adopt unreasonable ones. Benz v. D.L. Evans Bank, 152 Idaho 
215,231,268 P.3d 1167, 1183 (2012). Consistent with this law, the district court concluded that 
the speculation and conjecture of Plaintiffs experts were not sufficient to create a genuine issue of 
fact to be determined by a fact finder. 
E. KRINITT, SR., FAILS TO ESTABLISH THE REQUISITE ELEMENTS OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR. 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a way of establishing the element of breach in a 
negligence action where no other evidence of a breach is available. Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian 
Irrigation Dist., 97 Idaho 580, 583, 548 P.2d 80, 83 (1976). Res ipsa loquitur, if the doctrine is 
applicable to the facts of a particular case, creates an inference of a breach of a duty by a defendant. 
"Res ipsa loquitur leads only to the conclusion that the defendant has not exercised reasonable care, 
and is not in itself any proof that he was under a duty to do so." Brizendine, 97 Idaho at 583, citing 
Prosser, Law of Torts, s 39, p. 226 (4th ed. 1971). 
A plaintiff seeking to invoke the doctrine ofres ipsa loquitur must show: (1) the defendant 
exclusively controlled and managed the agency or instrumentality that caused the injury; and (2) the 
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circumstances permit "an average layperson to infer, based upon common knowledge and 
experience, that the plaintiff would not have suffered those injuries in the absence of the defendant's 
negligence." Enriquez v. Idaho Power Co., 152 Idaho 562, 566, 272 P.3d 534, 538 (2012). For res 
ipsa loquitur to apply it is "necessary that the cause of the injury point to the defendant's 
negligence." S.H Kress & Co. v. Godman, 95 Idaho 614, 617, 515 P.2d 561, 564 (1973). In other 
words, where the injury has other probable causes, a plaintiff must show the defendant was negligent 
in some way. Enriquez, 152 Idaho at 566,272 P.3d at 538. The mere happening ofan accident does 
not dispense with the requirement that the injured party must make some showing that the defendant 
against whom reliefis sought was in some manner negligent, where there are other probable causes 
of the injury. Christensen v. Potratz, 100 Idaho 352,355,597 P.2d 595, 598 (1979). 
Given the clear requirements that Plaintiff must satisfy to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur, i.e., that Schiff was in some way negligent and that Schiff had exclusive control of the 
clipboard, Plaintiffs argument that the burden is on IDFG to show that res ipsa loquitur "cannot 
possibly apply" is confusing. He cites no authority for this proposition. 
Contrary to his argument, Krinitt, Sr., fails to meet any of the requisite elements for the 
application of res ipsa loquitur. He did not establish that the clipboard was in the exclusive control 
of Schiff. He fails to show that any conduct of Schiff' s caused this accident. His brief is wholly 
inaccurate in its statement that: "The eyewitnesses agree that Schiff had the clipboard in the 
cockpit". Appellant's Brief, p. 19. IDFG is unable to locate this testimony and Krinitt, Sr., does not 
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cite to the record for this statement. The only testimony regarding the clipboard in the cockpit is that 
of Mike Atchison who testified that he saw the clipboard on the right-side seat before the occupants 
entered the cockpit more than 50 minutes before it crashed. See Footnote 2. 
The district court correctly ruled that Krinitt, Sr., failed to meet the requirements necessary 
to invoke the doctrine ofres ipsa loquitur. More importantly, Krinitt, Sr., is mistaken in his argument 
that the burden is upon IDFG to show that the doctrine does not apply. 
Res ipsa loquitur, where it applies, does not convert the defendant's general issue into 
an affirmative defense. When all the evidence is in, the question for the jury is 
whether the preponderance is with the plaintiff. Wherever the burden rests, he who 
undertakes to carry it must do more than create a doubt which the trier of fact is 
unable to resolve. This is but a particular application of the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur, which similarly is an aid to the plaintiff in sustaining the burden of proving 
breach of the duty of due care but does not avoid the requirement that upon the 
whole case he must prove the breach by the preponderance of evidence. 
C. C. Anderson Stores Co. v. Boise Water Corp., 84 Idaho 355, 360, 372 P.2d 752, 754-55 (1962) 
( citations omitted). 
Krinitt, Sr., cannot meet any of the elements required to apply res ipsa loquitur and, thus, he 
cannot rely on this doctrine to meet his burden to establish the breach of duty element of his 
negligence claim. 
F. KRINITT,SR.,FAILSTOESTABLISHTHEREQUISITEELEMENTSOFNEGLIGENCEPERSE. 
Krinitt alleges negligence per se on the part of IDFG because Schiff was permitted to 
participate in the flight without having undergone in-person training in the three years prior to the 
accident. Negligence per se, which results from the violation of a specific requirement of law or 
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ordinance, is a question oflaw to be decided by the Court. O'Loughlin v. Circle A Constr., 112 Idaho 
1048, 739 P.2d 347 (1987). "[I]n Idaho, it is well established that statutes and administrative 
regulations may define the applicable standard of care owed, and that violations of such statutes and 
regulations may constitute negligence per se." Nation, 144 Idaho at 190. Negligence per se does not 
arise in the context of a common law duty. To replace a common law duty of care with a duty of 
care based upon a statute or regulation, the following elements must be met: 
First, the statute or regulation must clearly define the required standard of conduct; 
second, the statute or regulation must have been intended to prevent the type of harm 
defendant's act or omission caused; third, the plaintiff must be a member of the class 
of persons the statute or regulation was designed to protect; and fourth, the violation 
must have been a proximate cause of the injury. 
Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609,617, 733 P.2d 1234, 1242 (1986) (citations omitted). 
In support of the negligence per se allegation, Krinitt submits the IDFG Regional Summary 
of Procedures but fails to provide any authority that this internal policy can give rise to a cause of 
action because of the violation of one or more of its provisions. This identical issue was addressed 
in Serv. Employees Int'! Union, Local 6 v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare, 106 Idaho 756,758,683 
P.2d 404, 406 (1984). In Serv. Employees, the appellant urged that a provision in the Department 
policy regarding employee grade violated rules of the Department contained in policies and 
procedures manual. He argued that this manual had the force and effect of law. The question 
presented was whether the Department's manual could give rise to a cause of action because of the 
violation of one or more of its provisions. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the Department's 
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policies and procedures manual, which was not promulgated pursuant to the procedural requirements 
of LC. § 67-5203, did not have the force or effect oflaw, and therefore even if a violation of the 
procedure set out in the manual had occurred, it could not be the predicate for a cause of action. 
Serv. Employees, 106 Idaho at 759. 
In addition, Krinitt, Sr., has failed to present any evidence that any alleged violation of the 
internal policy ofIDFG was the proximate cause of this accident, i.e., he has produced no evidence 
that any conduct of Schiff caused the accident: 
Violation of an applicable statutory prohibition or ordinance constitutes negligence 
per se, but the violation of the applicable statute or ordinance must be the proximate 
cause of the injury of which the plaintiff complains. Here the evidence failed to 
reveal the actual cause of the fire, but even assuming that the fire was caused by 
electrical wiring, the wiring must have been in violation of a statute or ordinance. 
Jerome Thriftway Drug, Inc. v. Winslow, 110 Idaho 615,618,717 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1986)(citations 
omitted). 
As with Serv. Employees Int 'l Union, the IDFG document must be construed as merely an 
internal guideline, not having the force and effect oflaw, and thus not giving rise to a cause of action 
based on an alleged violation. Serv. Employees, 106 Idaho at 759; see also Mallonee v. State, 139 
Idaho 615,620, 84 P.3d 551, 556 (2004). 
In summary, Krinitt, Sr. cannot rely on a theory of negligence per se to replace the common 
law duty of care because he can point to no authority establishing that the internal IDFG procedures 
manual is a statute or regulation. Thus, negligence per se does not apply. 
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G. THEOPINIONS0FKRINITT,SR.'SEXPERTSSTIMPS0NANDGRANDYWEREC0NSIDERED 
BY THE DISTRICT COURT. 
It is clear from the record and the district court's findings that it did not grant IDFG's motion 
to strike the affidavits of Douglas Stimpson and Larry Grandy. In fact, the district court referred to 
opinions from these experts in its findings. R. Vol. II, p. 394. The admissibility of evidence under 
I.R.C.P 56( e) is a threshold question the trial court must analyze before applying the rules governing 
motions for summary judgment. Shane v. Blair, 139 Idaho 126, 128, 75 P.3d 180, 182 (2003). The 
district court did so and obviously considered the affidavit and deposition testimony of these expert 
witnesses. Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 674,680,201 P.3d 647,653 (2009). Having admitted this 
evidence, there was no need for the trial court to identify the evidence that it excluded, or the reasons 
for it. Herrera, 146 Idaho 680. The district court's failure to issue a formal order denying IDFG's 
motion to strike the experts' opinions is not reversible error. 
Even with the admission of all of Krinitt, Sr.'s affidavits, deposition testimony, and 
discovery responses; viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Krinitt, Sr.; accepting the 
facts as alleged by Krinitt, Sr.; and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom; the district court 
ruled that the Krinitt, Sr.'s claims were based on speculation and suspicion and for that reason he 
failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact. The district court issued findings of fact and 
conclusions oflaw to summarize its analysis, although it was not required to do so. Therefore, any 
failure to issue a formal decision on the admission of Krinitt, Sr.' s experts affidavits and testimony 
was not material. Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho at 47 (holding that when the trial court fails to make 
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a finding on a material issue, remand may be disregarded by the appellate court only when the 
record is clear, and yields an obvious answer to the relevant question.) 
IDFG maintains that the opinions of Plaintiffs experts were inadmissible because they were 
based upon speculation; did not explain the pertinent scientific, technical or specialized knowledge 
principles utilized; and did not explain how those principles were applied to formulate their 
opinions, namely: that it was "likely" Schiffbecame nauseous, Schiff"most likely" opened the door, 
Schiff had control of the clipboard, and Schiff failed to maintain control ofit. Krinitt, Sr., also relies 
upon these"expert opinion" that even though there was no physical evidence that Schiff vomited, 
"that doesn't mean that there wouldn't be a likelihood or possibility" that she did (R. Vol. II, p. 216-
217), and the belief of his expert that "it's most likely that the door was opened to get some air." R. 
Vol. II, p. 222-223. These statements can only be viewed as nothing more than mere conjecture and 
speculation as to how Schiff may have been feeling and what Schiffs actions might have been. 
Secondly, admissibility depends on the validity of the expert's reasoning and methodology 
rather than on his ultimate conclusion. Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 140, 219 P.3d 453, 464 
(2009). The Court's function is to distinguish scientifically sound reasoning from that of the self-
validating expert who uses scientific terminology to present unsubstantiated personal beliefs. State 
v. Konechny, 134 Idaho 410, 418, 3 P.2d 535, 542 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000). The requirements for the 
admission of expert testimony are: 
The evidentiary rules which govern the court's determination of admissibility include 
I.R.E. 702, 703 and 403. Rule 702 provides: 
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If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, 
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion 
or otherwise. Thus, under Rule 702 qualified experts may testify in 
the form of an opinion only if their specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in 
issue. Because a verdict cannot rest on speculation or conjecture, 
Petersen v. Parry, 92 Idaho 647, 652, 448 P.2d 653, 658 (1968), 
expert opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated 
by facts in the record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its 
verdict, and therefore is inadmissible as evidence under Rule 702. 
Other courts have also held that experts may not give "net" or conclusory opinions, 
but only opinions which are substantiated by facts in evidence. McGlinchy v. Shell 
Chemical Co., 845 F.2d 802, 806 (9th Cir.1988) (district court properly excluded 
opinion testimony of expert who did not back up his opinion with specific facts, 
rather his opinion was speculative, resting on unsupported assumptions); Theonnes 
v. Hazen, 37 Wash.App. 644, 681 P.2d 1284 (1984) (opinion of an expert must be 
based on facts, and an opinion which is simply a conclusion or is based on an 
assumption is not evidence which will take the case to the jury). 
Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho at 46. 
Plaintiffs experts merely disguise their personal opinions about what might possibly have 
happened as "expert opinions." Krinitt, Sr., cannot avoid the law that affidavits containing general 
or conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific facts, are not sufficient to preclude entry of a 
summary judgment. Barlow's Inc., I 03 Idaho 310, 647 P.2d 766 (Ct.App.1982). 
H. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT SCHIFF OPENED THE DOOR. 
Krinitt, Sr., argues that: "None of the experts offered an opinion that the clipboard was in 
the possession of the pilot immediately ( or ever) prior to the accident. There was simply no 
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evidence upon which such an opinion could have been based ... " Brief of Appellant, pg. 14. This 
is true of all the occupants of the helicopter. There is simply no evidence upon which an opinion 
can be based as to where the clipboard was. 
There is no evidence as to how the bubble door of the helicopter became open. More 
critically, there is absolutely no evidence that Schiff voluntarily or purposely opened the door while 
the helicopter was in flight. Finally, there is no evidence that Schiff felt sick (R. Vol. I, p. 59) and, 
as a result, voluntarily and purposely opened the door of the helicopter while it was in flight. 
Again, Krinitt, Sr., has presented nothing more than speculation about how Schiff may have 
been feeling and imaginary conduct by Schiff to support the allegation that she caused the accident. 
Even at summary judgment, Plaintiff had the burden of proof to come forward with evidence to 
establish that there was an issue of fact. It is not sufficient to merely show a possibility or raise a 
suspicion that Schiff may have been negligent. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A fact finder's province cannot be founded in speculation and conjecture. In order for a case 
to proceed to a jury, the Plaintiff must produce more than guesswork. Krinitt, Sr., failed to meet his 
burden to come forward with admissible evidence of material facts to support the essential elements 
of his claim against IDFG. It takes some evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to take a case to 
the jury. Evans v. BannockCnty., 59 Idaho 442, 83 P.2d 427,432 (1938); Magee v. Hargrove Motor 
Co., 50 Idaho 442, 296 P. 774 (1931). Conclusions, inferences based upon inferences, speculation, 
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and conjecture do not get a case to the jury. While certainly a tragedy, speculating that Schiff and, 
thus, her employer IDFG, were to blame does not translate into a lawsuit. 
DATED: February 4, 2015. 
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Peter J. Johnson, ISBA #4105 
Attorney for Defendants-Respondents 
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